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Abstract. An important characteristic of mobile agents is that they often do not run on
their user’s platform, but on the platform of someone else. There often is no pre-existing
relation between the ’owner’ of the running agent’s process and the owner of the
platform on which the agent process runs. When there are conflicts the position of the
owner is not clear: is he allowed to slowdown the process or even remove it from the
system? And how can the interests of the owner of the agent be protected? This paper
explores the legal and technical perspectives to protecting the integrity of agent
processes.
1. Introduction
Mobility and relative autonomy are important characteristics of agents. Combined with
a virtually borderless Internet, these characteristics make it possible that software agents
are capable of migrating once, or more often, to run on different platforms to perform
their tasks. A platform may host multiple agents and usually allocates a process for each
running agent. It is becoming less evident that the owner of a software process and the
owner of the platform are the same or are even mutual related, either institutionally or
contractually. Nevertheless, the ’owner’ of the running agent’s process and the owner of
the platform on which the agent runs both run the risk that their integrity may be
violated by the other. When it comes to a confrontation, the owner of the platform has
the strongest position: he can slow down or even terminate the running agent’s process.
This raises the question whether a running agent’s process is at the mercy of the
platform owner.
This paper investigates whether the law protects the integrity of platforms and
running agents’ processes, and if so how. It also considers the circumstances when the
platform owner may have the upper hand. Technically, it is investigated what measures
can be taken to protect the integrity of both the agent and the platform and which
counter measures are possible. Questions of law are dealt with according to Dutch law.
The words ’computer system’ and ’platform’ are used interchangeably in this paper.
2. Legal Issues
2.1 Availability and Integrity
Legally, the integrity of a computer system is protected in both criminal law and civil
law. Civil ownership provides a basis to act against infrictions of integrity. Criminally, a
computer system is considered as a physical object, the damaging of which is a criminal
offence if it is done intentionally and without right (see art. 350 Dutch Criminal Code).
For an object to be damaged, it is sufficient that it has ceased to function (HR 19
October 1971, NJ 1972, 33); it need not be physically damaged. E.g. erasing relevant
parts of a computer’s operating system damages the system, provided it does no longer
function. Erasing a single Word-document from a computer’s hard disk leaves the
functioning of the computer intact and thus does not lead up to a damaged computer.
From the foregoing it appears that it is possible to affect the integrity of data without
affecting the integrity of the physical carrier of the data. This raises the question how
the integrity of data as such is protected in law. The integrity of data is protected in both
criminal and civil law. In civil law the affection of the integrity of data may constitute
an unlawful act. In criminal law the integrity of data as such is the subject of specific
criminal offenses (see art. 350a and 350b Dutch Criminal Code). The convention on
cybercrime gives an example of the statutory provision that is representative of the
national legal provisions protecting availability and integrity of data.
Article 4.1 Convention of Cybercrime (CoC) deals with data interference::
Article 4 – Data interference
1 Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when
committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration
or suppression of computer data without right.
We now focus on the question: may a system administrator remove or modify agent
processes without the consent of their owners? Note that when in this paper the 'owner'
of an running agent's process is mentioned, the word 'owner' denotes the person who
other than a system administrator has control over the running agent. Often this may be
the person in whose interest the agent runs. The word 'owner' is thus not used in its legal
meaning when used with respect to agents or agent processes. For stylistic reasons, the
word 'user' is also used as an alternative for 'owner'.
In analyzing the issue of removal or modification of agent processes, two situations
must be discerned. On the one hand, it is possible that the system administrator and the
user of the software agent have a contractual agreement about the use of the platform by
the agent. In this case, their mutual relation is governed by their contract and its terms
and conditions. We do not pursue this topic in this paper. On the other hand, it is
possible that no contractual agreement exists. In this case, the law must provide the
answer. As we saw, statutory law protects the availability and integrity of data. Data are
however not processes, but it seems reasonable to assume that processes cannot be
terminated without removing or altering data and that comparable considerations apply
with respect to processes.
From the provision of art. 4 CoC, it becomes clear that an affection of the integrity of
data is only a criminal offense if it is done 'without right'. It is thus relevant to determine
whether a system administrator acts without right (or not) if he removes an agent's
process from his platform or modifies it. On the one hand, the system administrator is
the owner of his platform, or he acts on behalf of the owner. An owner may in general
remove or alter data and processes that reside or run on his platform. On the other hand,
the system administrator has allowed the software agent to commence running on his
platform at some point in the past. Therewith he may or may not have raised certain
expectations. Furthermore, it is the question whether he may exercise his rights as an
owner without regard for the interests of other people, viz. the 'owner' of an agent's
process running on his platform. In order to identify the circumstances that are relevant
two judgments, one from Dutch and one from American case law are analyzed below.
American case law is of course not directly of interest for Dutch law, and is solely used
for identifying relevant circumstances in dealing with integrity problems of software
agents.
2.2 Relevant caselaw: Xs4all/ABFAB
The judgement of Hof Amsterdam 18 July 2002 LJN-number AE5514 (ABFAB/Xs4all)
focuses on the question whether an ISP (Xs4all) can require a sender of commercial e-
mail to refrain from sending mail to the subscribers of the ISP. Xs4all based her
contention that an ISP may indeed require so, on her ownership of computer capacity,
transmission capacity and subscriber collection. The court held however that the nature
of the service that Xs4all offered, implied that the general public must have the
possibility to send e-mail to her subscribers. This and the fact that e-mail is of
increasing importance in society, made that the sending of e-mail cannot easily be said
to be a violation of Xs4all’s right in the computer capacity etc. It fits in better with the
public character of the service-provision to accept that the freedom that Xs4all claims
for herself as an owner is bound to certain restrictions.
For a system administrator (modifying an agent) this means that a reference to his
(employer’s) ownership of the system may not be enough to establish that he did not act
’without right’. This is especially so if the service is public in nature and is relevant for
society. The system administrator will have to bring by additional circumstances in
order to construe his authority to touch the integrity of the mobile agent. Such additional
circumstances may be found in the reason the system administrator has to modify the
agent, e.g. to maintain system integrity.
2.3 Relevant caselaw: Bidder’s Edge/eBay
eBay is an Internet-based, person-to-person trading site (eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge,
Inc. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, N.D. Cal. 2000). eBay offers sellers the ability to list items
for sale and prospective buyers the ability to search those listings and bid on items.
Bidder’s Edge (BE) is an auction aggregation site designed to offer on-line auction
buyers the ability to search for items across numerous on-line auctions without having
to search each auction individually. The information available on the BE site is
contained in a database of information that BE compiles through access to auction sites
such as eBay.
eBay demanded that BE ceased accessing the eBay site, because BE’s queries for
filling her database consumed capacity of eBay’s system. The court found that BE’s
access to the site constituted a trespass to chattels. A trespass to chattels is defined by
the court as an intentional interference with the possession of personal property has
proximately caused injury. See Thrifty-Tel v. Beznik, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566
(1996). If this trespass consists of accessing a computer system, the plaintiff must
establish that: (1) defendant intentionally and without authorization interfered with
plaintiff’s possessory interest in the computer system; and (2) that defendant’s
unauthorized use proximately resulted in damage to plaintiff. See Thrifty-Tel, 46 Cal.
App. 4th at 1566; see also Itano v. Colonial Yacht Anchorage, 267 Cal. App. 2d 84, 90
(1968).
With respect to the first requirement, the court concluded that BE’s activity is
sufficiently outside of the scope of the use permitted by eBay that it is unauthorized for
the purposes of establishing a trespass. Although the website is publicly accessible,
eBay does not grant the public unconditional access and does not generally permit the
type of automated access made by BE. In fact, eBay explicitly notifies automated
visitors that their access is not permitted. BE continued however to "crawl" eBay’s web
site even after eBay demanded BE to terminate this activity. The court decided that even
if BE’s web crawlers were authorized to make individual queries of eBay’s system, BE’s
web crawlers exceeded the scope of any such consent when they begin acting like
robots by making repeated queries. With respect to the second requirement the court
held that eBay suffered damage by the mere fact that BE’s use is appropriating eBay’s
personal property by using valuable bandwidth and capacity, and necessarily
compromising eBay’s ability to use that capacity for its own purposes.
This judgment identifies issues in the case of a system administrator removing
unwanted agent processes In the first place, it is relevant under what conditions the
system administrator has allowed a software agent to use his system. In this respect, it is
relevant that the software agent or its user can recognize that the system administrator
imposes conditions and the nature of these conditions. In the second place, it is relevant
to what extent the software agent uses the capacity of the system administrator’s system.
In the above case, it wasn’t necessary that alternative uses were frustrated by the fact
that BE used the system. It was sufficient that capacity was consumed that could have
been used by eBay or its customers.
2.4 Analysis
The system administrator, as the owner, allows software agents to use his agent
platform. The system administrator may or may not bind the use by the software agents
to certain conditions. At a later point in time the system administrator may want to
disallow the use of his platform. What is he to do with running agent processes? Can
these processes only be prematurely removed from the platform with the consent of the
agent’s user or can the system administrator remove agent processes from his platform
without consent of the agent’s user or even against their will? A preliminary analysis of
case law has been performed in order to find the arguments pro and contra interference
by the system administrator. This analysis made clear that the following circumstances
are relevant:
• Has the owner of the platform stated conditions to the use of his system? Has the
agent process or its ’owner’ violated these conditions? Does the absence of
conditions raise expectations about the usability of the platform for use by software
agents? With respect to the conditions other issues may be relevant, such as: is it
recognisable that conditions are being imposed? Is the nature of these conditions
recognisable for the software agent or its user?
• What interest has the owner of the platform to disallow further use of his system?
Does he suffer damage? Is the platform's integrity affected? Are – real or potential –
other uses of system capacity precluded by the software agent?
• What is the nature and seriousness of the measures taken against the software agent?
Requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity diminish the system administrator's
leeway.
• What is the nature of the service provided to the users of software agents? Is it a
public service? Is the service important for society, such as an e-mail service? To
what extent must the interests of the 'owner' of the agent process in its
unencumbered functioning be protected?
For practical purposes it is of course wise to log the pertinent situations and actions in
order to (be able to) proof the facts that underpin ones position in court.
3. Technical Issues
In computer systems, integrity is an important feature: improper alteration of a system
(and its assets) should be detectable and recoverable (Anderson, 2001; Tanenbaum and
Steen, 2002). The integrity of both the agent and the agent platform is important in the
context of this paper. Both an agent’s and an agent platform’s integrity need to be
protected from other agents and agent platforms. The integrity of users and system
administrators is not taken into account in this paper.
3.1 Agent Integrity
An agent needs to be protected from unwanted alterations, caused by system
malfunctions or malicious entities, e.g. other agents or agent platforms. An altered agent
may act differently (potentially maliciously), thereby risking its usefulness and
potentially also the reputation of the agent itself and its users. Altering agents which
carry confidential information (e.g., their human counterpart’s credit card information)
may cause more damage than altering an agent which doesn’t. Note that some agents are
more crucial to the correct functioning of an application than others, when, e.g., an
agent in a swarm application becomes corrupted, the effect may be negligible. To
protect the integrity of an agent it is necessary that the agent has a unique identity,
which distinguishes the agent from all other agents.
Techniques to detect improper modifications are mainly based on tracing alterations
to an agent. A mobile agent may need to carry these traces during its life span if agent
platforms ’en route’ cannot be trusted. One technique is to use an agent container
(Karnik and Tripathi, 2001; Noordende, Brazier and Tanenbaum, 2002) as the unit for
transportation of an agent and its associated information, as alterations are securely
logged. Alternatively, the agent may regularly visit a trusted third party for an integrity
check.
Techniques to recover from improper alterations are usually based on restoring
information from a copy (a ’backup’) at a secure location. Agents with built-in fault
tolerance may recover more easily, even if one process of the agent becomes corrupted
or is terminated (Marin, Sens, Briot and Guessoum, 2001). Error correction techniques
(e.g. as used for data communication over a telephone line) are rarely used as their
effectiveness is limited. If no backup is available, then perhaps information can be
restored by replaying past behaviour (and consulting relevant agents and agent
platforms).
An agent also needs protection from an agent platform. Unfortunately, an agent
platform has enormous power over an agent which cannot easily be restrained. Some
solutions advocate special purpose hardware, others develop cryptographic techniques
(e.g. Sander and Tschudin, 1998). Protocols requiring agent platforms to provide a
rationale for their modifications to agents may also be needed. More research is clearly
required.
An agent may need to provide ’a reason’ for its actions, e.g. to determine liability of
users. For this purpose, an agent may be obliged to keep a trace of information
(including orders) received from users and possibly from other agents, together with its
responses.
In sum, standards are required for protocols and auditing logs concerning agent
integrity; this area requires more research, especially with respect to heterogeneous
large-scale open systems.
3.2 Agent Platform Integrity
An agent platform hosts agents, possibly from different users and involved in different
applications. Agents residing at an agent platform compete for its resources (such as
processor cycles, bandwidth, disk space) and services (such as (reliable and secure)
communication, mobility, automated updates, streaming connections). Breaches of the
integrity of an agent platform may result in malfunctioning of agents being hosted, and
possible lead to loss of reputation of the agent platform’s holder. Note that an agent
platform needs not only be protected from agents it hosts, but also from other agent
platforms. To preserve integrity of an agent platform, the agent platform needs to have
policies for access control, prevention, monitoring and corrective action; usually
provided by a system administrator. Existing agent platforms currently address these
and other security issues (including FIPA-OS, e.g. Poslad and Calisti, 2000).
Access control
Policies for access control, i.e. deciding whether an agent is to be hosted by the agent
platform, are usually based on the agent’s identity, and possible on information of its
user, or other characteristics. In addition, the decision may be influenced by information
on reputation or gossip, and observations of the (expected) load of the agent platform
itself.
In case of updating the Bidder’s Edge database software robots were used to search,
amongst others, eBay’s database. eBays’s system administrator could identify agents
such as the Bidder’s Edge agents. Their agents could, for example, be identified by the
IP-addresses from which they originated.
When deciding to host an agent, constraints may be imposed, including permissions
(read/write to specific information, execution of other programs) and resource
consumption constraints (e.g., Jansen, 2001). In case of eBay for example, it was
technically possible for Bidder’s Edge agents to extensively access eBay.
Prevention
An agent platform may assign different levels of ’trust’ to agents it hosts. To limit
possible damage, preventive measures may be taken. One measure is to check an agent’s
code for viruses and other malignant behaviour; this is, alas, impossible, as formal
verification does not provide a fast answer if any, and software which scans for, e.g.,
viruses can only detect known or similar problems. A safer approach is to have an agent
only use code which is known to be safe, e.g. by regenerating an agent’s code using an
agent factory (Brazier, Overeinder, Steen and Wijngaards, 2002). Another measure is to
place the agent in a safer, restricted, execution environment, known as a ’sandbox’, e.g.
the Java Virtual Machine, with which unwanted code commands can be intercepted. In
the case of Ebay, preventive measures were not of relevance, as far as can be deduced
from the judgement.
Monitoring
To provide a reliable environment for each of its agents, an agent platform needs to
monitor itself to detect unwanted behaviour. Often, unwanted behaviour is caused by
unexpected resource consumption of correctly functioning agents: e.g. when all agents
access specific databases in the system congestion and overloading may occur.
Detection of unwanted behaviour is complicated by the level of detail which may be
needed, and the overhead of information transfer and processing generated by the
monitoring system: a policy is required. It is, in general, not possible to monitor all
actions of all agents in minute detail; but it is possible to monitor resource consumption
on computers hosting these agents and use this information for management purposes
(Mobach, Overeinder, Wijngaards and Brazier, 2003). For example, an agent which
increases its use of the processor and sends thousands of messages per time unit, may be
involved in an unwanted activity. Monitoring message content may only be feasible in
specific cases, and has an impact on the privacy of agents and their users.
Another source of information is from outside entities such as system administrators,
agents, trusted third parties, and other agent platforms. This information needs to be
assigned a level of trust, before a subsequent action is taken.
Corrective actions
An agent platform requires guidelines for which automated corrective action to take in
which situation, as too many potential situations may emerge to involve a human
system administrator. A misbehaving system administrator’s agent may be treated
differently than someone else’s misbehaving untrusted agent. Possible corrective actions
include:
• slowing down an agent by allocating fewer processor-cycles,
• adjusting an agent’s permissions and resource allocations, e.g. to limit message
sending to once per large-time-unit,
• moving an agent into a sandbox,
• forcing an agent to migrate to another agent platform (possibly with the agent’s
latest internal state, otherwise causing the agent to revert to its last saved state),
• returning the agent, by stopping the agent and sending the agent (together with last
saved state) to human counterpart(s),
• killing an agent (including deleting its identity from location services),
• updating and distributing reputation and trust information with regard to this agent,
• consulting a system administrator.
In the eBay case the agent platform could consider isolating the suspicious Bidder’s
Edge agents in such a way that is not harmful to eBay’s system, possibly while storing
enough data in order to allow the agents to resume on another system (this was not an
option for eBay). A more drastic option which eBay’s system administrator could
consider is killing Bidder’s Edge agents. In all cases the system administrator could
consider notifying the owner of the agents (Bidder’s Edge) of their illegal presence and
their potential termination.
The agent platform is required to maintain a trace of its corrective actions possibly
with a rationale, and may require a protocol for notifying agents or their users related to
the subjects of corrective actions. A rationale should specify the (potential) damages to
be caused by the agents involved and the appropriateness of the corrective actions taken.
4. Discussion
The conditions under which access to a computer system is granted are relevant.
Nevertheless, a number of outstanding questions with respect to these conditions
remain. The conditions for use of the system must, e.g., be clearly communicated to the
software agent and its user by the system administrator. A straightforward way to
’communicate’ the conditions is perhaps a system that is able to ’physically’ prohibit any
use of the system that violates the conditions. If a platform can actively prohibit usage
which violates the conditions, then a question is whether a platform can distinguish
between usage satisfying or violating the conditions.
Technical measures may have an all or nothing character: allowing either too much
or too less. In the eBay v. BE case, the former blocked at one point the latter’s IP-
addresses in an attempt to prohibit the uses that violated the conditions. This measure
did however not differentiate between uses that satisfied or violated the conditions. This
case also highlights a second drawback of physical measures: BE easily robbed the
measure of its effectiveness by using a proxy-server, thus hiding her IP-address and
nullifying the effect of eBay’s IP-blocking. In addition, technical measures may, on their
own, make the precise conditions for use insufficiently explicit: was e.g. BE’s access
through the proxy-server allowed since it was not blocked or must IP-blocking be
understood to be a general denial of access?
It is indispensable to have a protocol that facilitates communication of the conditions
of use much more clearly and explicitly than is the case with ’coercive technical
measures’. A distinction needs to be made with respect to the recipient of the conditions
of use. If they are to be communicated to the software agent, a protocol is required that
can express that conditions are being communicated and specify these conditions, in
such a way that this is meaningful for the software agent. In addition, it is desirable for
communication of conditions to guarantee non-repudiation of receipt, i.e. it must be
provable that the software agent has undeniably received and understood the conditions.
An appropriate protocol could, e.g., require a software agent to acknowledge receipt of
the conditions. If the conditions are to be communicated to the owner of the software
agent, the owner must be identifiable and have a contact address. Again, a protocol is
necessary, including non-repudiation of receipt.
For the time being, system administrators may still be confronted with the presence
of ’suspicious’ agent’s processes on their systems. The technical analysis has shown that
there is a whole range of measures a system administrator can take against software
agents violating conditions for use. These measures range from reducing resources for
the agent to removing the agent from the system. The legal demands of proportionality
and subsidiarity imply that the least far-reaching measures that are effective must be
chosen. The question is, however, the effects of these measures. The answer to this
question may be learned by experience as it largely depends on dependencies between
large numbers of co-operating agents and does not lend itself very well for imposition
by a legislator. However, learning by experience does not come by of its own.
Experiences have to be collected and discussed, a subject that lends itself very well for
self-regulation by organisations of system administrators. The outcome of such
collection and discussion can be laid down in directives that can guide system
administrators in their approach to agent processes that go beyond the latter’s allowed
use.
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